Despite occasional disclaimers, Herman and Chomsky tend to express a more instrumental view of the media as a tool of the state and capital. It is one thing to observe that the parameters of debate about the Vietnam War in the media closely hewed to the range of views held by political elites, and excluded the anti-war movement. It is quite another to reduce to a unified propaganda system the many reasons why news organizations depend primarily on elite government sources (including journalists' need for sources presumed to be legitimate, knowledgeable, available, and accountable to citizens), 2 Closed versions of hegemony also tend to be implicitly functionalist. 5 The scholar begins with an assumption that the news fits the reified "demands" or "needs" of a larger system or ideology. Morgan strays in this direction when he writes that "it is inconceivable that the ideological premises of the larger hegemonic order were ever seriously challenged in a manner presented as legitimate by the mainstream media." From this standpoint, resistance, transformation and contradictions can be ignored or portrayed as easily recouped by hegemony.
Consider Gitlin's oft-cited explanation for why the media and state sometimes appear independent from capital. In liberal capitalist societies, he writes, "the relative autonomy of the different sectors legitimates the system as a whole." 6 Certainly these images were unrepresentative of all war coverage. But no matter how much journalists limited their criticisms to presenting the war as a tactical error, or as overly costly to Americans rather than Vietnamese, today these pictures do not fit snugly into a recuperative public history that Morgan describes as a "pastiche of images and texts which have proven highly useful to political elites intent on furthering the interests of global capital or the political Right."
Morgan briefly mentions that the hegemonic media are vulnerable to opposition from independent journalism, but would seem to attribute these images' critical power to "viewers' subjective responses to the imagery they encounter in the mainstream culture." But why did these images get into the commercial news media at all, and why were they shown repeatedly?
Kellner suggests that there are real contradictions that arise between the media's interests in maximizing their own profits, serving the interests of the corporate sector as a whole, legitimating hegemonic ideas, honoring professional codes of objectivity, and maintaining credibility with audiences by appearing to chronicle events of public significance and represent the full diversity of viewpoints on them. 7 The fact that the media so often serve the first three interests better than the last three does not mean that they can forget the latter ones entirely.
When organizers get good media coverage, they do so in part by appealing to expectations that the media will cover important issues fairly and represent citizens' views, not simply to the journalistic lust for conflict and color.
Models of Change
Morgan and Gitlin note that Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) overestimated the chances of sudden, structural change in the late sixties, in part because of the images of revolt that they saw portrayed in dramatic media coverage. Have we ourselves overcome the notion that the only substantive change is revolutionary, and that all else is mere compromise and reform that only end up strengthening "the system"? Do we still draw on a revolutionary model of change as the standard by which the success of movements, and the identity of players within them, is judged? This view tends to dichotomize potentially dialectical relationships between revolutionary and reformist movements, radicals and pragmatists, resistant and dominant ideologies, transforming the political-economic structure and trying to change a policy. one by Hallin's count, but protest was no longer automatically stigmatized as traitorous.
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Morgan tends to belittle opposition to the war emanating from outside the New Left as failing to critique U.S. aggression, characterizing the moderate marchers as holding "a perspective that at times became hard to distinguish from administration rhetoric." Why, then, were they marching on Washington?
A view of social change as an all or nothing process threatens to make movements seem futile at times when revolution is unattainable (which is most of the time), and cuts off radical actors from strategically choosing allies among "moderates." As William Gamson notes, "it is a major achievement of some movements that they succeed in moving issues from the uncontested to the contested realm." 12 And the radical wing of that movement accomplishes something when it helps legitimate a moderate wing, even if it fails to get the credit in the media, government or public opinion. Yes, the events of 1968 appeared to turn the public against both the war and the anti-war movement (at least its radical wing, which I suspect supplied the image that poll respondents had in mind when asked about whether they approved of the protests.) But a Pyrrhic victory is different from a total loss. Morgan mentions briefly that the movement helped end the American onslaught before it destroyed Indochina completely. Widespread coverage of the New Left's demonstrations, however negative, and of the state-sponsored violence that confronted protestors, raised the war's price in domestic conflict to those who would have pursued it even more aggressively. Within the movement, even if the mainstream "doves" in government and the Moratorium based their opposition to the war on its costs to the U.S. rather than on its impact on Vietnam, New Left protests helped raise those costs. In addition, movements can lose the short-term struggle over framing events and enjoy more success in the long-term. Morgan notes that public opinion eventually came around to idea that war was immoral, and that the "Vietnam syndrome" has put some constraints on American militarism, although clearly not enough. If SDS dissolved, it provided a training ground for many organizers who went on to lead and participate in subsequent movements. Is it accurate, then, to think of hegemony as having been "restored" in the same form it took before the war? Or has it instead been transformed, and how?
These observations raise the question of how change occurs dialectically, a question that is undertheorized by those of us who rely on the notion of hegemony. Consider the frequently demonstrated finding that the range of views in the news is indexed to elite perspectives. 13 The black box for many of these studies is elite opinion, how it changes, and how movements might 
Reflexivity of Social Movements
In her study of how the feminist movement approached the media in the 1970s, and Europe, they have emphasized threats to consumers' health and right to know about the contents of their food; in the developing world, they have pointed to Western multinationals' interest in rubbing out small farmers and traditional cultures by locking up intellectual property rights to the stuff of life. 16 They have eschewed ideological purity, making both "moderate" appeals to consumers' interest in protecting themselves against "Frankenfoods," and offering "radical" analyses of corporate power over the food system. That strategy is likely to be all the more necessary when movements seek participation from diverse international interests, and must speak through a wide array of mass media, from the local to the global levels.
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